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DENIAL OF FTC RULEMAKING POWERS
In National Petroleum Refiners Association v. FTC,' the District
Court for the District of Columbia held that the Federal Trade Com-
mission (FTC) lacks the statutory authority2 to promulgate Trade
Regulation Rules3 having the effect of substantive law. Conclud-
ing that a failure to indicate octane numbers on gasoline dispensing
pumps could constitute an unfair or deceptive act or practice viola-
tive of the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTCA),4 the Commis-
1. 340 F. Supp. 1343 (D.D.C. 1972), noted in 18 S. DAKoTA L. Rnv. 243
(1973).
2. See Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (1970).
3. The term "Trade Regulation Rule" refers to a legislatively promulgated reg-
ulation issued by the FTC following a hearing of industry representatives. Such
Trade Regulation Rules are enacted upon the initiative of the Commission, as
contrasted with trade practice rules which are often issued on the initiative of
the industries involved. See note 18 infra.
4. On July 29, 1969, the FTC filed a notice that it had initiated a pro-
ceeding for the promulgation of a Trade Regulation Rule. See 34 Fed. Reg. 12,449
(1969). The new rule, the text of which was contained in the notice, would be is-
sued pursuant to the FTCA, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (1970), and to provisions of Part
I, Subpart B of the Commission procedure and rules of practice, 16 C.F.R. §§
1.11-.16 (1972). The FTC proposal was addressed to the subject of mandatory
posting of research octane numbers on gasoline dispensing pumps by refiners and
other marketers of gasoline. Id.
Octane numbers or ratings are a designation of the anti-knock qualities of a
gasoline. The research method is but one of several means of determining this
property, the motor method being another. The FTC stated that it had initiated
the proceeding having reason to believe that not to so post octane ratings may con-
stitute deception and an unfair trade practice. The Commission argued that failure
to post ratings could result in consumers either purchasing gasoline with an unnec-
essarily high octane rating and thereby wasting money, or purchasing a "sub-reg-
ular" gasoline which could cause engine damage. It was stated that where the
Trade Regulation Rule was relevant in further adjudication, the Commission would
be able to rely on the rule provided the respondent was given a full hearing on the
applicability of the rule in the given case. The notice invited the submission of
data and oral presentations and urged the expression of approval or disapproval
and the suggestion of amendments to the proposed rule. On December 30, 1970,
the Commission issued such a rule, 36 Fed. Reg. 354 (1971), and made a state-
ment supporting its rule-making authority. Referral was made there to the State-
ment of Basis and Purpose accompanying the Trade Regulation for the Preven-
tion of Unfair or Deceptive Advertising of Labelling of Cigarettes in Relation to
the Health Hazards of Smoking, 29 Fed. Reg. 8325 (1964). The Commission de-
layed the effective date of the rule to September 1, 1971, 36 Fed. Reg. 7309 (1971)
in order that it might consider a revision brought about by a subsequent develop-
ment concerning the lead content of gasoline. This brought into question the
appropriateness of utilizing the research method of obtaining octane ratings. The
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sion issued a rule requiring gasoline refiners and marketers to post
such ratings.' Thirty-four oil companies and two refinery associa-
tions subsequently filed an action contending that the FTC lacked
authority under the Federal Trade Commission Act to promulgate
such rules." The district court granted plaintiffs' motion for sum-
mary judgment, holding that the rule-making power granted in the
FTCA7 was limited solely to the authority to make procedural rules
and regulations in connection with the Commission's investigatory
responsibilities and housekeeping chores.'
Congressional debate prior to the 1914 enactment of the
FTCA9 reflected heated controversy over the extent of the powers
such an agency should possess.10  In its final version," section 5 of
the FTCA empowered the FTC to "prevent" unfair methods of
competition-conferring upon the Commission quasi-judicial powers
to file complaints, to hold hearings to determine whether violations
of the FTCA were occurring, and to issue cease and desist orders
to terminate such violations.' 2 In addition, section 6 of the FTCA
granted the FTC broad investigatory powers;18 however, despite
several unsuccessful attempts to alter the language to expressly
rule was subsequently withdrawn and an alternative rule was proposed on August 17,
1971; the new rule provided that the required octane number was the average of
the research and motor octane numbers. On December 16, 1971 the revised rule
was issued, effective March 15, 1972, 16 C.F.R. § 422.1 (1972). This was the final
action of the Commission, effective but for a stay of the District Court entered
by Judge Aubrey E. Robinson, Jr., 340 F. Supp. at 1350.
5. 16 C.F.R. §§ 1.11-.16 (1972).
6. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (1970).
7. Id. § 46(g).
8. 340 F. Supp. at 1348-49. See note 15 inIra.
9. Widespread demand for greater assistance in the enforcement of the anti-
trust laws led to the establishment of the Federal Trade Commission. For a history
of the formation of the FTC, see Baker & Baum, Section 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act: A Continuing Process of Redefinition, 7 ViLL. L. R v. 517 (1962).
10. Sentiment ran from that of desiring a purely investigatory body to that of
wanting to grant broad rule-making powers. See Baker & Baum, supra note 9, at
525-27; 51 CONG. REc. 8845, 9047, 9056 (1914).
11. Act of Sept. 26, 1914, ch. 311, 38 Stat. 717. The scope of the Com-
mission's interest at this time was limited to "unfair methods of competition." Id.
at 719. The Commission's area of concern was widened by the Wheeler-Lea
Amendment, Act of March 21, 1938, ch. 49, § 3, 52 Stat. 111. This Act added
the words "unfair or deceptive acts or practices" to the language of section 5(a) (6),
15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(6) (1970), thus making it clear that the Commission can pro-
tect the consumer through direct means as well as through the protection of compe-
tition.
12. Id. § 45.
13. Id. § 46.
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grant the Commission legislative rule-making authority,14 it was only
in the context of those investigatory powers that any reference was
made to rules or regulations. 15 During the past decade, the FTC was
expressly granted rule-making power over certain activities of spec-
ified industries. 6 Significantly, the statutory language in these spe-
cific grants more closely resembles the typical language of grants
of rule-making authority to other agencies than it does the origi-
nal language of section 5.17
The FTC had traditionally exercised its authority almost en-
tirely through its section 5 power to issue cease and desist orders,
although non-binding trade practice rules were frequently issued
and adhered to voluntarily by the industries concerned.18  In 1962,
14. See 51 CoNa. REC. 9047-50, 9056-57 (1914). It was mentioned in debate
that the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce had considered
and purposely deleted amendments which would make the Commission's mandate
and powers clearly analogous to those of the Interstate Commerce Commission. The
feeling was expressed that the broad area of interest of the FTC would not allow
the expertise achieved by the ICC in regulating a narrow industry. Concern was
also expressed over the effect of such powers on state rules already in force as
they related to the proposed legislation.
The debate on the Senate-House Conference Report raised questions concern-
ing the powers of the Commission. At that time, Congressman Covington, one
of the sponsors of the bill, stated that the Commission would have no power to
prescribe methods of competition to be used in the future. He went on to point out
that "[i]n issuing its orders [the Commission] will not be exercising power of a
legislative nature." Id. at 14,932.
It was also suggested that the Commission would in no sense exercise a leg-
islative function such as that which is exercised by the ICC. Committee member
Stevens remarked that "[wle desired clearly to exclude that authority from the power
of the commission." Id. at 14,938.
15. 15 U.S.C. § 46(g) (1970). This section grants the Commission power
"[flrom time to time to classify corporations and to make rules and regulations
for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of sections 41 to 46 and 47 to 58 of
this title." Id.
16. Wool Products Labeling Act, 15 U.S.C. 8H 68-68j (1970); Fur Products
Labeling Act, id. H8 69-69j; Textile Fiber Products Identification Act, id. H8 70-
70k; Flammable Fabrics Act, id. H§ 1191-1204; Fair Packaging and Labeling Act,
id. H8 1451-61. The original language of the Flammable Fabrics Act, 67 Stat.
112 (1953), was similar to that of the FTCA. This language was amended to
make the Act similar in format to the other above-mentioned statutes, specifying
the subjects upon which rules could be issued and expressly stating that a viola-
tion of such rules would constitute a violation of the FTCA. 81 Stat. 571 (1967).
The purpose of the amendment was to provide for regulations "to be issued under
rulemaking procedures rather than having them fixed by law . . . ." H.R. REP.
No. 972, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1967).
17. See, e.g., Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 195(i) (1970) (grant-
ing rule-making power to the FCC); Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. § 717o (1970)
(granting rule-making power to the FPC).
18. Trade practice rules were promulgated, often at the initiative of the indus-
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however, the Commission amended its rules and procedures to pre-
scribe a method for the adoption of "Trade Regulation Rules,"'19
which were to have the force of law. Through this mode of en-
forcement the FTC could simply charge the violator with an act
contrary to the rule; it would then only be required to prove a vio-
lation of the rule rather than satisfy the more onerous burden of
showing that the act was an unfair trade practice within the mean-
ing of the FTCA. 0
Pursuant to this new procedure and prior to the promulga-
tion of the Gasoline Octane Rule, the FTC had issued such rules
in a variety of areas. The most ambitious of these was a rule re-
lating to the prevention of unfair or deceptive advertising and la-
beling of cigarettes. 2 In response to a challenge mounted by the
cigarette industry,22 the Commission, in promulgating the rule, is-
sued an extensive statement articulating the basis for its authority to
promulgate Trade Regulation Rules. 23  In support of the Commis-
sion's claimed authority, the statement cited the "rules and regula-
tions" language of section 6(g),24 arguing that the word "rules" in
section 6(g) is properly defined as in the Administrative Proce-
dure Act: "[T]he whole or part of an agency statement of general
or particular applicability and future effect designed to implement,
interpret, or prescribe law or policy .. ."I' The Commission fur-
ther relied on its statutory grant of authority to "prevent" the use
of "unfair methods of competition" and "unfair or deceptive acts
or procedures." 06  Taking the view that the authority to issue cease
tries involved, to prescribe a voluntary course of action for the industry and to
provide for an advance opinion from the Commission as to the legality of such ac-
tion. These rules did not have the force of law. When the Commission took le-
gal action in such a case, the charge was not a violation of the trade practice
rule but of the underlying statute. In such proceedings, the FTC was required
to prove de novo the unfairness of the action and was not permitted to rely pon
the rule. In the Commission's present procedures and rules of practice, these rules
are also referred to as Industry Guides. 16 C.F.R. §§ 1.5, 1.6 (1972). For ex-
amples of such trade practice rules, see id. §§ 22 (frozen food industry), 139.1
(wine industry), 152 (hosiery industry), 209 (grocery industry).
19. 27 Fed. Reg. 4609 (1962). See 16 C.F.R. §§ 1.11-.16 (1972).
20. For a list of other statutes violations of which also constitute violations of
the FTCA, see note 16 supra and accompanying text.
21. 29 Fed. Reg. 8324 (1964), as revised, id. at 12,626, text deleted and cross-
reference added, 30 Fed. Reg. 9485 (1965).
22. See 29 Fed. Reg. 8324, 8365 (1964).
23. Id. at 8364.
24. Id. See 15 U.S.C. § 46(g) (1970).
25. 5U.S.C. § 551(4) (1970).
26. 15 U.S.C. §45(a)(6) (1970).
Vol. 1973:157]
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
and desist orders27 is only one vehicle by which the agency was
intended to exercise its general powers, the Commission asserted
that substantive rule-making power was a necessary implication of
Congress' establishment of the FTC as not merely a quasi-court
but rather as an administrative agency. 28  The agency argued
that the mandate to "prevent" unfair competition and practices is
so broad that, absent express statutory language to the contrary,
the powers which are necessary and proper to the fulfillment of
the directive are to be implied from the mandate. Perhaps recog-
nizing the implicit weakness of its position, however, the Commis-
sion devoted a vast portion of its argument to the proposition that
such power is also desirable and advantageous to the efficient per-
formance of its duties.2 9  Despite the pains the Commission took
to support its authority, Congress expressly pre-empted that posi-
tion by passing cigarette-labeling legislation and superseding, with-
out comment, several other rules.30
Prior to the National Petroleum Refiners decision, the general
concensus among commentators had been that the Commission was
significantly weaker in its statutory rule-making authority than its
companion agencies;3 1 although rule-making authority was con-
27. Id. § 45(b).
28. 29 Fed. Reg. 8369 (1964).
29. Id. at 8366. For the argument that, even absent a separate conferment
of rule-making power, an agency with a degree of discretion possesses implied
power (though of questionable legal effect) to the extent that it can state in ad-
vance what its attitude will be, see DAVIs § 6.16 (Supp. 1970).
30. The Trade Regulation Rule relating to the unsolicited mailing of credit
cards, 35 Fed. Reg. 4614 (1970), rescinded, 36 Fed. Reg. 45 (1971), was super-
seded by provisions in the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1642-44 (1970).
The proposed rule relating to shipment of unordered merchandise, 35 Fed. Reg.
10,116 (1970), public hearing cancelled, id. at 14,328, was superseded by provi-
sions of the Postal Reorganization Act, 39 U.S.C. § 3009 (1970). The rule re-
lating to the prevention of unfair or deceptive advertising in labeling of cigarettes,
29 Fed. Reg. 12,626, 15,570 (1964), was pre-empted by the Federal Cigarette La-
beling and Advertising Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-40 (1970). In the case of the cig-
arette rule, Congress made it clear that it was not commenting on or changing
the FTC authority by its action. See Act of July 27, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-92, § 5,
79 Stat. 283.
31. See generally Baker & Baum, supra note 9; R. Burris & H. Teter, Anti-
trust: Rulemaking v. Adjudication in the FTC, 54 GEO. L.J. 1106 (1965); Han-
dler, Unfair Competition, 21 IowA L. Rav. 175 (1936); Shapiro, The Choice of
Rulemaking or Adjudication in the Development of Administrative Policy, 78 HAv.
L. REv. 921 (1965); Weston, Deceptive Advertising and the Federal Trade Com-
mission: Decline of Caveat Emptor, 24 FED. BAR 1. 548 (1964). But see DAVIs
§§ 6.16, 6.18 (Supp. 1970); Forte, The Food and Drug Administration, the Fed-
eral Trade Commission and the Deceptive Packaging of Foods, 40 N.Y.U.L. Rv.
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ceded to be desirable for the Commission, congressional action was
felt to be necessary to grant such authority. Judicial review of the
FTC's substantive rule-making authority did not occur prior to
1962, however, because the Commission had not attempted to issue
such substantive rules. When the FTC did begin to assert this
authority, judicial review was effectively circumvented by the fact
that the rules issued were either non-controversial or, if controver-
sial, soon superseded by congressional regulation. 32 Therefore,
although the courts had explored the FTC's other powers,"n as
the advantages of a rule-making power became clear to the agency
and the FTC accordingly began attempting to assert such a power,
little judicial basis existed to determine the validity of the out-
come.
4
Relying heavily upon the legislative history of the FTCA,
the National Petroleum Refiners court held that the Commission
lacks the requisite statutory authority to issue Trade Regulation
Rules. 5 The court noted that at the time of Congress' 1914 de-
bate of the FTCA there were several unsuccessful attempts to
amend the bill and to create a more powerful agency,3 and the
court concluded that Congress intended specifically to withhold the
rule-making power-which would have been clearly granted if the
proposed amendments to the bill had been approved-from the
860 (1965); Wegman, Cigarettes and Health: A Legal Analysis, 51 CORNELL L.Q.
678 (1966).
32. See note 30 supra for citations concerning the supersession of the ciga-
rette rule and other Trade Regulation Rules. Heretofore the courts had refused to
enjoin the FTC from having proposed hearings preliminary to the issuance of Trade
Regulation Rules, holding that the cases would be ripe for adjudication only if a rule
was issued. Bristol-Meyers v. FTC, 424 F.2d 935 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 824 (1970) (proposed rule regulating certain aspects of commerce in medi-
cines); Lever Brothers Co. v. FTC, 325 F. Supp. 371 (D. Me. 1971) (proposed
rule prohibiting sale of synthetic detergents without disclosing ingredients and
warning of the contribution to pollution of any phosphates).
33. See note 42 infra.
34. With respect to the National Labor Relations Act, however, the Supreme
Court had said that "[tihe 'national meaning of words cannot be displaced by ref-
erence to difficulties in administration.'" Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Prods., Inc.,
322 U.S. 607, 617 (1944), quoting Commonwealth v. Grunseit, 67 Comm. L.R. 58,
80 (Austl. 1943).
35. 340 F. Supp. at 1345-47. In support of its interpretation, the court cited
the views of the author of the bill, Congressman Covington, and other statements
made in the course of the House debate concerning what effect the wording of the
bill would have. 51 CONG. Rnc. 8845, 9056-57, 14,932, 14938 (1914). See note
14 supra.
36. 340 F. Supp. at 1346, citing 51 CoNG. Rac. 9047-50, 9056-57 (1914).
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Commission. In addition, the court rejected the Commission's con-
tention that "rule," in section 6(g) of the FTCA, 7 should be
defined as it is in the Adinistrative Procedure ActY8  The court
noted that the passage of the FTCA preceded that of the APA by
over thirty years and that there was no cross-reference between the
two statutes; 9 from these facts the court drew the inference that
Congress did not expect the FTC to engage in substantive rule-
making activity in the manner prescribed in the APA. The court
further refused to interpret the statutory provision authorizing the
Commission to "prevent" unfair methods of competition 40 to con-
stitute an implied rule-making power;41 although it acknowledged
that such imprecise grants of power to other agencies have been sus-
tained in the past,42 the court indicated that such cases did not in-
37. 15 U.S.C. § 46(g) (1970).
38. 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (1970).
39. The court noted that the NLRA was passed prior to the APA and was
amended specifically to refer to the APA, see 29 U.S.C. § 156 (1970); however,
Congress found no such change necessary in the FTCA. 340 F. Supp. at 1348.
40. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(6) (1970).
41. 340 F. Supp. at 1349. The court specifically pointed to the next para-
graph in section 5(b), 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (1970), and its requirement that ad-
judicative proceedings be used with the issuance of cease and desist orders.
42. 340 F. Supp. at 1349. In several cases, the Supreme Court had sustained
imprecise grants of power; however, these cases are distinguishable since there was
not a strong legislative history to the contrary as in the case of the FrCA. See
United States v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 643 (1961) (holding that the legislative history of
statute was not strong enough to overcome the plain language of the statute); United
States v. Public Utilities Commissions, 345 U.S. 295 (1953) (holding the legislative
history not strong enough to negate a grant of power to the commission); National
Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943) (holding the legislative
history not to clearly negate implied grant of legislative power to FCC). But see
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (where the Court
analyzed Congress' generally limited ability to delegate legislative power in the
form of creating quasi-judicial commissions). Although the District of Columbia
Circuit had held that agencies cannot regulate in such a manner as to expand
the statutory power, FTC v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 242 F.2d 31 (D.C. Cir. 1951)
(findings of fact being expressed in "dollars" while the rule was expressed in
"pounds," the rule was therefore invalid since it was not properly based upon find-
ings as required by the statute); Textile & Apparel Group, Am. Importers Ass'n
v. FTC, 410 F.2d 1052 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 910 (1969) (holding
Wool Act's authorizing FTC to require labeling and authorizing the issuance of
cease and desist orders did not authorize rule under which imports were inter-
cepted and tested), in United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632 (1950), the
Supreme Court, by reading the FTCA as an integrated whole, affirmed the power of
the FTC to apply its regulation beyond the literal language of the individual sec-
tions of the statute.
The National Petroleum Refiners decision exaggerates the apparent distinctions
in the language of the various statutes granting rule-making authority to administra-
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volve the overwhelmingly contrary legislative history of the
FTCA s The court found further support for its interpretation of
the FTCA in the particularity of the subsequent grants by Con-
gress of substantive rule-making power to the agency;44 the fact that
Congress later granted such rule-making power to the FTC in
particular areas45 was seen by the court as an implication that Con-
gress had not intended to grant general rule-making power in the
FTCA. The court also interpreted the congressional action of su-
perseding several Trade Regulation Rules as an implicit rejection of
the efficacy of such rules, and the court attributed some signifi-
tive agencies. See notes 16, 17 supra and accompanying text. While differ-
ences in the statutes do exist, it is nonetheless true that the language in each of
the statutes discussed by the court is imprecise. Indeed, given the parallel structure
and functions of many administrative agencies and the general similarity in
statutory language granting rule-making authority to these bodies, the court's em-
phasis on slight distinctions that exist in such language seems less than convincing.
Similarly, in interpreting Congress' motives in superseding several of the FTC's
Trade Regulation Rules, the court ignored the fact that Congress clearly concluded
that the action was not to be taken in any way as affecting or commenting on
the Commission's rule-making authority.
The NLRB amendment, referred to at 340 F. Supp. 1348, was likewise mis-
understood. There would seem to be no need to comment on the meaning of
"rules" with respect to APA definitions unless the meaning was to be other than
that given generally for other agencies. Thus, the FTC's argument would seem to
be following the court's suggestion in looking at the FTCA as an integrated whole
as directed by United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632 (1950). Reading
the statute as a whole, the mandate to "prevent" could be interpreted as granting
to the FTC the authority ordinarily given to agencies, with any further language
in the FTCA being interpreted as simply adding to that power. Perhaps such
ambiguity in this and other statutes suggests a general need for the clarification
of the powers of administrative bodies.
43. 340 F. Supp. at 1349, citing United States v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 643 (1961);
United States v. Public Util. Comm'ns, 345 U.S. 295 (1953); National Broadcasting
Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943).
44. 340 F. Supp. at 1347 n.17. The court further noted the amendment to the
Flammable Fabrics Act, 81 Stat. 570 (1967), and the statement of the report of
the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce that the amendment
was designed to make the act more flexible by permitting "regulations to be is-
sued under substantive rule-making procedure rather than having them fixed
by law as is now the case." H.R. REP. No. 972, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1967).
The court suggested that there was a similar need to spell out the substantive
rule-making authority in the case of section 6(g) of the FTCA. The court stated
that the Commission's traditional failure to assert such rule-making authority indi-
cated the Fr's awareness that it had not been granted this rule-making au-
thority originally, 340 F. Supp. at 1347. The court further noted the repeated
admission of the FTC that it has no power to promulgate substantive rules of
law, citing FTC Annual Reports, id. at 1347, n.16, and testimony before Senate
and House Committees, id. at 1350 n.33.
45. See note 16 supra.
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cance to the fact that Congress has not yet passed a pending bill4
which would amend section 6(g) of the FTCA so as to authorize
the Commission to legislate rules defining the unfair or deceptive
practices referred to in section 5(a) (1).17 The court sum-
marized the FTC's argument as a "bootstrap operation," requiring
not a construction but an impermissible enlargement of the statute."
The decision in National Petroleum Refiners confirms the com-
mon prior impression that the FTC was operating beyond its stat-
utory authorization in promulgating Trade Regulation Rules.4 The
district court's documentation of the legislative history makes it clear
the FTC was indeed meant to be distinct from the other bodies
in its limited power-the congressional intent was to withhold rule-
making authority from the Commission." Nevertheless, the deci-
sion will have significant effects. At the most obvious level, the
case51 will lead to the nullification of the small conglomeration
of Trade Regulation Rules which the Commission has promulgated
in recent years.52 The ultimate effect on consumers is not imme-
46. See note 53 infra.
47. It is dangerous to speculate as to why Congress failed to pass legislation.
The court merely mentioned this in passing by way of a footnote. 340 F. Supp. at
1350 n.33.
48. Id. at 1350.
49. See note 31 supra and accompanying text.
50. See note 35 supra and accompanying text. A thorough reading of the
cited debate uncovers a congressional hesitancy to grant sweeping power over a
broad area. This is similar to the concern expressed recently with respect to
bills now pending in Congress which would grant the FTC rule-making authority
in unquestionable terms. See 117 CONG. RFc. S17,828 (remarks of Senator Moss),
S17,857 (remarks of Senator Hruska), S17,873 (remarks of Senator Cotton), S17,-
884 (remarks of Senator Cooper) (daily ed. Nov. 8, 1971).
51. The FTC filed its appellate briefs on July 19, 1972; the appellees filed
their reply brief on August 16, 1972.
52. 16 C.F.R. §§ 401-06, 409-10, 412-14, 417-18, 419, 422-24. The absence of
earlier court challenges to these regulations would seem to indicate their non-con-
troversial nature.
Most of the more important regulations have been superseded by Congress.
See note 30, supra. Pending the final outcome of its rule-making authority, the
FTC has continued to follow its procedure for the promulgation of Trade Regula-
tion Rules. On January 4, 1973 the FTC released a revised Trade Regulation Rule
dealing with the presentation of consumer claims and defenses in credit sales. 38
Fed. Reg. 892 (1972). The order of the National Petroleum Refiners court de-
clared null and void only the rule relating to the posting of gasoline octane num-
bers. While any enforcement of other Trade Regulation Rules would inevitably re-
sult in their being struck down, the FTC was not enjoined from the promulgation
of new rules.
Realizing the uncertain status of its Trade Regulation Rules, the FTC, in is-
suing its rule on door to door sales, insisted that it has the authority to promulgate
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diately apparent, however, since the impact of the case in this re-
spect is largely dependent upon the changes in the FTC authority
which National Petroleum Refiners could generate in Congress and
upon the ensuing changes in FTC activity. The decision may well
urge Congress to accelerate its action on bills now pending which
would give the Commission rule-making authority.53 Thus, the im-
portance of National Petroleum Refiners is found in the fact that the
case may serve as a catalyst in forcing a long-needed crystaliza-
tion of the imprecisely-worded powers of the FTC. Congress may
now be forced to consider the advantages and disadvantages of
allowing an agency governing the broad area encompassed by the
FTCA to issue legislative rules with the effect of substantive law.
It is immediately apparent that the ability of the FTC to is-
sue rules would have definite advantages. 4 Since the issuance of
substantive principles is an implicit part of the Commission's ad-
judicatory powers, the primary question raised in National Petro-
leum Refiners was not whether rules are to be made, but rather
the manner in which they will be issued. If such regulations are
issued through the process of legislative rule-making, the gathering
and evaluation of information is simplified; furthermore, the views
of interested persons excluded in a case-by-case adjudicatory process
would be considered.5 The rule-making process is not limited by
the confines of a quasi-judicial procedure incorporating time-con-
suming, albeit necessary, safeguards of individual rights; it is more
difficult to issue broad, meaningful rules in cases of adjudication
such rules. 37 Fed. Reg. 22934, 22944 (1972), but nevertheless deferred an an-
nouncement of an effective date, citing the pending litigation of the Commis-
sion's rule-making authority. Id. at 22961.
53. S.986, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); H.R. 4809, 92d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1971). Opposition has been expressed to granting the Commission unrestricted
rule-making authority, however, as evidenced by the sixty day congressional veto
incorporated into the Senate bill. See 117 CoNG REc. S17,828 (remarks of Senator
Moss), S17,857 (remarks of Senator Hruska), S17,873 (remarks of Senator Cotton),
S17,884 (remarks of Senator Cooper) (daily ed. Nov. 8, 1971). The House bill,
with its less cumbersome procedure, is preferred by the Commission. BNA ANTi-
TusT AND TRADE RE. REP. No. 560, p. A-1 (1972).
54. See generally DAvis, § 6.15 (Supp. 1970); Shapiro, The Choice of Rule-
making or Adjudication in the Development of Administrative Policy, 78 HAv. L.
REv. 921 (1965). See also 29 Fed. Reg. 8364 (1964).
55. Of course, in adjudication, interested persons may file briefs as amici curiae.
For a discussion of the limited allowance made for public participation in informal
F TC proceedings and the unclear but limited provisions for intervention of inter-
ested parties in formal FTC adjudicatory proceedings, see Comment, Public Par.
ticipation in Federal Administrative Proceedings, 120 U. PA. L. Rpv. 702, 789-
812 (1972).
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where the Commission is seeking justice in the individual case be-
ing prosecuted. It is also true that adjudicative rules have retro-
active effect, thus working unforeseen, hardships on the first groups
prosecuted and resulting in an unfair stigmatization of those indi-
viduals as lawbreakers. Given the Commission's necessarily limited
resources, continued restriction to the use of less efficient cease and
desist orders may, in effect, prevent it from providing adequate pro-
tection to the consumer. By issuing rules, an agency may be bet-
ter equipped to utilize the expertise of its staff to make industry-
wide rulings which would provide advance guidance as to the law-
ful limits of industry action. 6
There are, however, certain dangers involved in granting rule-
making authority over such a broad area as the FTC regulates.
Unchecked, this authority could result in an enormously powerful
agency. Also, in a grant of discretionary power over a broad area
to a single body, such an agency may be hard-pressed to bring to
bear the same degree of expertise which agencies confined to more
narrow areas could develop.5 7  These considerations have prompted,
in the pending congressional grant of authority, an evident desire
for reservations and safeguards."" A balancing of conflicting con-
siderations could properly lead to the enactment of a statute quite
similar to that proposed by S. 986,19 which would grant the FTC
rule-making authority, while retaining a congressional veto over the
Commission's rules. The National Petroleum Refiners decision thus
may prompt long-needed legislative clarification and reform with
respect to the Commission's powers.
56. But cf. text accompanying note 57 infra.
57. Weston, Deceptive Advertising, supra note 31, at 571.
58. 117 CONM. REc., supra note 50. See note 53 supra.
59. S. 986, supra note 53.
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